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We introduce a weakening of the Preparation Independence Postulate of Pusey, Barrett, and
Rudolph that does not presuppose that the space of ontic states resulting from a product state
preparation can be represented by the Cartesian product of subsystem state spaces. On the basis of
this weakened assumption, it is shown that, in any model that reproduces the quantum probabilities,
any pair of pure quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉 with 〈φ|ψ〉 ≤ 1/√2 must be ontologically distinct.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem [1]
demonstrates, against the background of the ontologi-
cal models framework [2], that from an independence
assumption regarding product-state preparations, the
Preparation Independence Postulate, it follows that any
pair of distinct pure quantum states are ontologically
distinct—that is, for any theory that reproduces the
quantum probabilities for outcomes of experiments, the
probability distributions over the ontic state space cor-
responding to preparations of the two states have null
overlap.
The context of the theorem is nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics, which is known not to be a fundamental the-
ory, but a nonrelativistic limit of a more fundamental
theory, quantum field theory, which is itself thought to
be a low-energy limit of some more fundamental theory.
This raises the question of the relevance of such results
to the ontology of the actual world. One attitude that
has been taken is that such results concern a hypothetical
world in which quantum mechanics is exactly correct [3].
Another attitude, which is the one that is adopted in this
article, is that one can and should seek to draw conclu-
sions about the actual world from theorems of this sort.
This requires one to seek to formulate theorems on the
basis of assumptions that might reasonably be expected
to hold of successor theories to quantum mechanics. In
particular, the theorems should not rely on assumptions
that are generically violated by quantum field theories.
The key assumption of the PBR theorem is the Prepa-
ration Independence Postulate (PIP). This is meant to
apply to independent pure-state preparations performed
on two or more quantum systems. The postulate is the
conjunction of two assumptions. On the terminology
of ref. [3], these are the Cartesian Product Assump-
tion (CPA), that the state space of the joint system
may be represented as the Cartesian product of state
spaces of the subsystems, and the No Correlation As-
sumption (NCA), that the joint probability distributions
corresponding to the various possible joint preparations
are products of distributions corresponding to prepara-
tions on the individual subsystems.
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The CPA is violated in a relativistic quantum field the-
ory. In such theories, entanglement between spacelike
separated regions is generic, and independent prepara-
tions at spacelike separation cannot be assumed to re-
move all entanglement, though they may produce an ar-
bitrarily close approximation to a product state (see ref.
[4] for discussion). Any theorem that can be taken to
be robust under the transition from nonrelativistic quan-
tum mechanics to a relativistic quantum field theory, and
beyond, must not rely on the Cartesian Product Assump-
tion.
In what follows, we adopt the framework of the PBR
theorem but drop the CPA. As the NCA cannot even
be formulated in the absence of the CPA, a substitute
is required that does not presuppose the CPA. The in-
dependence assumption adopted is what we will call the
Preparation Uninformativeness Condition (PUC): when
choices of preparation procedures to be performed on two
or more systems are made independently, then, given a
complete specification of the resulting ontic state, infor-
mation about which preparation was performed on one
system is not informative about which preparation was
performed on the others. This, of course, is entailed by
the PIP, but it is strictly weaker than it. As is shown
in the Appendix, even if the NCA is assumed, the PUC
does not entail the NCA.
The conclusion we will arrive at is that any pair of
pure quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉 with |〈φ|ψ〉| ≤ 1/√2 must
be ontologically distinct. The method used in ref. [1]
to extend a result of this sort to arbitrary distinct states
makes essential use of the Preparation Independence Pos-
tulate. There does not seem to be any obvious way to
achieve the same result using only the PUC; we leave it
as an open question whether this can be done.
II. THE ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
FRAMEWORK
We adopt the ontological models framework of ref. [2].
In this framework, with any physical system is associ-
ated a measurable space 〈Λ,S〉, where Λ is the space of
possible ontic states of the system, and S is a σ-algebra
of subsets of Λ, which are the subsets to which probabil-
ities will be assigned. With any preparation procedure
ψ is associated a probability measure Pψ on 〈Λ,S〉. It
2is assumed that, for any experiment E that can be per-
formed on the system, with a finite set KE of outcomes,
there exists, for each k ∈ KE, a measurable function
pEk : Λ → [0, 1], such that for any λ ∈ Λ, pEk (λ) is the
probability, in state λ, that the experiment E yields the
result k. These must satisfy, for all λ ∈ Λ,
∑
k∈KE
pEk (λ) = 1. (1)
The probability of result k, given preparation ψ, is then
PEψ (k) = 〈 pEk 〉ψ , (2)
where 〈 · 〉ψ denotes expectation value with respect to
the probability measure Pψ .
We will say that two quantum states |ψ〉, |φ〉 are on-
tologically distinct if and only if, for any procedures that
prepare the two states, the corresponding probability dis-
tributions have disjoint supports. We will also want to
consider states that are close to being ontologically dis-
tinct, and for this we need a way of quantifying the dif-
ference between two probability distributions. One such
way is afforded by the statistical distance, also known as
the total variation distance:
δ(P,Q) = sup
A∈S
|P (A) −Q(A)| . (3)
Its value ranges between 0, when P = Q, and 1, when
P and Q have disjoint supports. If P and Q have densi-
ties p, q, with respect to some measure µ, the statistical
distance can be written in terms of these densities.
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
∫
Λ
|p− q| dµ = 1−
∫
Λ
min(p, q) dµ. (4)
Define the classical overlap of the two distributions as
ω(P,Q) = 1− δ(P,Q) =
∫
Λ
min(p, q) dµ. (5)
We will also be concerned with the Hellinger distance,
which is proportional to the L2 distance between √p and√
q.
H(P,Q) =
1√
2
‖√p−√q‖
2
=
(
1
2
∫
Λ
(
√
p−√q)2 dµ
)1/2
. (6)
This satisfies
H(P,Q)2 = 1−
∫
Λ
√
p q dµ. (7)
The fidelity F (P,Q), also known as the Battacharyya co-
efficient, is defined as
F (P,Q) = 1−H(P,Q)2 =
∫
Λ
√
p q dµ. (8)
The classical overlap ω and the fidelity F satisfy the in-
equalities
ω(P,Q) ≤ F (P,Q) ≤
(∫
Λ
p q dµ
)1/2
. (9)
This gives,
δ(P,Q) ≥ H(P,Q)2 ≥ 1−
(∫
Λ
pq dµ
)1/2
. (10)
For our ψ-ontology result, we will not presume that
the state space of a composite system is the Cartesian
product of the state spaces of subsystems. It does not
follow from this that one cannot attribute ontic states to
the components of a composite system. Given a system
Σ, with state space Λ, composed of subsystems {σi}, we
assume subsystem state spaces {Λi}. Presumably, the
state of Σ uniquely determines the states of the subsys-
tems. This means that, for each i, there is a function
fi : Λ→ Λi such that fi(λ) is the ontic state of σi when
the ontic state of Σ is λ. One possibility is, of course,
that these are projections from a Cartesian product to
its components. Another possibility would be for the
ontic state space of Σ to consist of quantum states and
for the functions fi to yield reduced states obtained by
tracing out all components except σi. In what follows,
nothing is presupposed about the relation between the
state space Λ and the subsystem spaces Λi, which will
play no role in the arguments.
III. PBR’S EXAMPLE
We will utilize the example employed by PBR. Con-
sider two systems, located in regions A and B (which we
will use to denote both the regions and the systems lo-
cated therein). Let {|0〉A, |1〉A} be a pair of orthogonal
states of A, and similarly for {|0〉B, |1〉B}. Define
|+〉A,B = 1√
2
(|0〉A,B + |1〉A,B)
|−〉A,B = 1√
2
(|0〉A,B − |1〉A,B)
(11)
Each of the systems is prepared, independently, in its |0〉
or |+〉 state. This yields four possible preparations of the
joint system: {|0〉A|0〉B, |0〉A|+〉B, |0〉A|+〉B, |+〉A|+〉B}.
It is assumed that there are probability distributions
{P00, P0+, P+0, P++} on the ontic state space of the joint
system, corresponding to these four preparations.
Consider the following orthonormal basis for the
Hilbert space of the joint system:
|ξ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉B + |1〉A|0〉B)
|ξ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|−〉B + |1〉A|+〉B)
|ξ3〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉A|1〉B + |−〉A|0〉B)
|ξ4〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉A|−〉B + |−〉A|+〉B) .
(12)
3Each of these states is orthogonal to one of the prepa-
ration states. If an experiment is performed with these
states as the possible results, the condition that quan-
tum probabilities be recovered entails that, on distribu-
tion P00, outcome 1 has probability zero, etc.. Thus, no
matter what result obtains, it rules out one of the four
preparations.
Now suppose that we impose the Preparation Inde-
pendence Postulate: the ontic state space Λ of the joint
system AB is the Cartesian product of the ontic state
spaces ΛA, ΛB of the component systems, and the prepa-
ration distributions factorize; that is, there exist proba-
bility measures PAx , P
B
y , for x, y ∈ {0,+}, such that for
all measurable ∆A ⊆ ΛA and ∆B ⊆ ΛB,
Pxy(∆A ×∆B) = PAx (∆A)PAy (∆B). (13)
This, together with the condition that each outcome has
probability zero in some preparation, yields the conclu-
sion that the overlaps ω(PA0 , P
A
+ ) and ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ) satisfy
ω(PA0 , P
A
+ ) ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ) = 0. (14)
If, now, A and B are systems of the same kind sub-
ject to the same choices of preparation procedures,
ω(PA0 , P
A
+ ) = ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ), and so
ω(PA0 , P
A
+ ) = ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ) = 0, (15)
and hence
δ(PA0 , P
A
+ ) = δ(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ) = 1. (16)
The argument generalizes beyond the idealized case of
perfect preclusion. Suppose that, for each outcome
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, there exists a preparation 〈x, y〉 such that
Pxy(k) ≤ ε. On the assumption of the Preparation Inde-
pendence Postulate, it follows that
ω(PA0 , P
A
+ )ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ) ≤ 4ε, (17)
and hence, if ω(PA0 , P
A
+ ) = ω(P
B
0 , P
B
+ ),
δ(PA0 , P
A
+ ) ≥ 1− 2
√
ε. (18)
See ref. [1] Supplementary Information for details of the
proof.
IV. THE PREPARATION
UNINFORMATIVENESS CONDITION
We wish to find a substitute for the Preparation Inde-
pendence Postulate that does not presuppose the Carte-
sian Product Assumption, or even that the Cartesian
product of the subsystem state spaces can be embed-
ded in the state space of the joint system. Thus, the
weakenings of the CPA proposed in refs [5, 6], on which
the state space considered is the Cartesian product of
the component state spaces and another space that en-
codes nonlocal information, will not suit our purposes.
The condition that we will impose is the following. Sup-
pose that, for systems A, B, we have some set of pos-
sible preparations of the individual systems. Suppose
that the choice of preparation for each of the subsys-
tems is made independently. Following the preparation
of the joint system, which consists of individual prepara-
tions on the subsystems, you are not told which prepa-
ration has been performed, but you are given a complete
specification of the ontic state of the joint system. On
the basis of this information, you have degrees of belief
about which preparations were performed. In the case
of ontologically distinct preparations, you will be certain
about what preparations were performed; if the prepa-
rations are not ontologically distinct, you may have less
than total information about which preparations were
performed.
We ask: under these conditions, is information about
which preparation was performed on one system infor-
mative about which preparation was performed on the
other? The Preparation Uninformativeness Condition is
the condition that it is not. Note that it is automatically
satisfied if the preparations are ontologically distinct. In
such a case, given the ontic state of the joint system, you
know precisely which preparations have been performed,
and being told about the preparation on one system does
not add to your stock of knowledge.
One way for the PUC to be violated is to have the ontic
state space of the joint system be the Cartesian product
of the subsystem ontic spaces, and the joint probabil-
ity distributions be ones in which the states of the sub-
systems are correlated. It is also violated, as we shall
see, by models, such as those constructed in ref. [7], on
which nonorthogonal quantum states are never ontologi-
cally distinct.
The PUC is implied by the PIP, but it is strictly
weaker. As shown in the Appendix, even if the CPA is
assumed, it is possible to construct models for the PBR
setup, in which the PUC is satisfied but P00 and P0+ have
nonnull overlap, which by the PBR theorem, is ruled out
for models that satisfy the NCA.
We now state the PUC more formally. Let x ∈ X ,
y ∈ Y be variables ranging over finite sets of possible
preparations of A, B, respectively. We assume that x
and y are chosen independently, with probabilities px, qy
in (0, 1). Let Pxy be the probability distribution over the
ontic state space Λ of the joint system, corresponding
to preparation x on A and y on B. The procedure of
independently choosing x and y and preparing Pxy yields
a mixed distribution,
P¯ =
∑
x,y
px qy Pxy. (19)
Suppose that, knowing that the system AB has been pre-
pared in this way, but not knowing which preparation was
chosen, you are given the information that the ontic state
λ of AB is in some measurable subset ∆ ⊆ Λ. Condi-
4tional on that information, your degree of belief in the
proposition Aa, that A was subjected to preparation a,
should be
P¯ (Aa|∆) =
pa
∑
y qyPay(∆)
P¯ (∆)
. (20)
Your degree of belief that B was subjected to preparation
b should be
P¯ (Bb|∆) = qb
∑
x pxPxb(∆)
P¯ (∆)
, (21)
and your degree of belief that the joint preparation is
〈a, b〉 should be
P¯ (AaBb|∆) = pa qb Pab(∆)
P¯ (∆)
. (22)
The condition that learning Bb have no effect on your
degree of belief in Aa, and vice versa, is the condition
that
P¯ (Aa Bb|∆) = P¯ (Aa|∆)P¯ (Bb|∆). (23)
We impose the condition that this hold, not for arbi-
trary sets ∆, but for a maximal specification of the ontic
state. If the ontic state space has atoms that are as-
signed nonzero probability by some or all of the prepara-
tion distribution, we will take (25) to hold for those; in
the general case, we take it to hold in the limit of increas-
ingly specific state descriptions. Let the distributions Pxy
have density functions µxy with respect to some measure
Q that dominates them all. For any λ ∈ ΛAB (except,
perhaps, for a set that has measure zero on all of the
preparation distributions), and for any ε > 0, it is possi-
ble to find a set δε(λ) containing λ, with Q(δε(λ)) > 0, on
which all of the density functions µxy vary by less than
ε. If {δε(λ)} is a family of such sets, we have
lim
ε→0
Pxy(δε(λ))
Q(δε(λ))
= µxy(λ). (24)
We impose the condition that
lim
ε→0
[
P¯ (Aa Bb|δε(λ))− P¯ (Aa|δε(λ)) P¯ (Bb|δε(λ))
]
= 0.
(25)
This is equivalent to
µab(λ)∑
x,y px qy µxy(λ)
=
∑
x,y px qy µay(λ)µxb(λ)
(
∑
x,y px qy µxy(λ))
2
, (26)
or,
∑
x,y
px qy (µab(λ)µxy(λ)− µay(λ)µxb(λ)) = 0. (27)
If this is to hold for arbitrary probabilities {px}, {qy},
we must have
µab(λ)µxy(λ) = µxb(λ)µay(λ). (28)
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y . If there are density functions such
that (28) holds for almost all λ, we can always construct
density functions for which it holds for all λ. Though the
values of the density functions will depend on the choice
of background measure Q used to define the densities,
the choice will not affect whether (28) is satisfied.
We take as our formal definition of the Preparation
Uninformativeness Condition: A set of probability dis-
tributions {Pxy |x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } on a common measur-
able space 〈Λ,S〉 will be said to satisfy the PUC if and
only if they have densities {µxy} that satisfy (28) for all
λ ∈ ΛAB and all a, x ∈ X , b, y ∈ Y .
For the special case in which the choice of preparations
consists of only two alternatives {0,+} for each subsys-
tem, this is the condition that, for all λ ∈ ΛAB,
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) = µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ). (29)
V. A ψ-ONTOLOGY RESULT
With the PUC in place, it is possible to show that, for
the PBR example, respecting the quantum preclusions
entails that |0〉A|0〉B and |+〉A|+〉B are ontologically dis-
tinct, as are |0〉A|+〉B and |+〉A|0〉B.
Theorem 1. Let Pxy, x, y ∈ {0,+} be four probability
distributions on a measurable space 〈Λ,S〉, that satisfy
the Preparation Uninformativeness Condition. If there
is an experiment E, such that each outcome of E is pre-
cluded by some Pxy, then P00 and P++ have null overlap,
as do P0+ and P+0.
Proof. Since every preparation is ruled out by some out-
come, the four distributions have null joint overlap. This
means that, for almost all λ,
µ++(λ)µ00(λ)µ+0(λ)µ0+(λ) = 0. (30)
We assume the PUC,
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) = µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ). (31)
Then
µ++(λ)µ00(λ)µ+0(λ)µ0+(λ) = (µ00(λ)µ++(λ))
2, (32)
and so
µ++(λ)µ00(λ) = µ+0(λ)µ0+(λ) = 0 (33)
for almost all λ.
It is easy to see intuitively why the PUC entails that
P++ and P00 have null overlap. Since every preparation is
ruled out by some outcome, there is no subset of Λ that
is assigned positive probability by all four preparation
measures. It follows from this that, if µ++ and µ00 have
non-null overlap, then the PUC is violated. To see this,
suppose that, for some λ, µ++(λ) and µ00(λ) are both
nonzero. Then, for any such λ (except perhaps for a set
5of measure zero), either µ+0(λ) or µ0+(λ) (or both) is
zero. Suppose that µ+0(λ) = 0. Then, conditional on the
information that the state is λ, you have nonzero degree
of belief in preparations |0〉A|0〉B and |+〉A|+〉B, and zero
degree of belief in |+〉A|0〉B. If, now, you are informed
that the A-preparation was |+〉A, this permits you to
conclude that the B-preparation was |+〉B, in violation
of the PUC.
The assumption that strict preclusion is possible is not
an assumption that survives the transition to quantum
field theory. In a quantum field theory, no experiment
that can be performed in a bounded spacetime region
has probability strictly zero for any outcome. We need,
therefore, a generalization of the result that does not pre-
sume strict preclusion.
We will say that an outcome k is ε-precluded by a prob-
ability distribution P iff the probability assigned to k by
P is less than or equal to ε. In place of strict preclusion,
we will assume that, for every ε > 0, there is an ex-
periment that achieves ε-preclusion. This is sufficient to
yield the conclusion that P++ and P00 are ontologically
distinct.
Theorem 2. Let Pxy, x, y ∈ {0,+} be four probability
distributions on a measurable space 〈Λ,S〉 that satisfy the
Preparation Uninformativeness Condition. If there is an
m-outcome experiment E, such that each outcome of E
is ε-precluded by some Pxy, then
δ(P00, P++) ≥ H(P00, P++)2 ≥ 1− 2
√
mε,
and
δ(P0+, P+0) ≥ H(P0+, P+0)2 ≥ 1− 2
√
mε.
Proof. Let P¯ be the equally weighted mixture of the four
probability distributions.
P¯ =
1
4
∑
x,y
Pxy. (34)
Since each Pxy is absolutely continuous with respect to
P¯ , by the Radon-Nikodym theorem it has a density µxy
with respect to P¯ . Since, for each x, y, P¯ (∆) ≥ Pxy(∆)/4
for all ∆ ∈ S, we must have
µxy(λ) ≤ 4 (35)
for almost all λ ∈ Λ.
Let K be the outcome-set of the experiment E, and
let {pk | k ∈ K} be the functions that yield probabilities
for these outcomes. These must satisfy, for all λ,
∑
k∈K
pk(λ) = 1. (36)
Let K0 be the subset of K consisting of outcomes that
are ε-precluded by either P00 or P++, and let K1 be the
set of outcomes that are ε-precluded by either P0+ or
P+0. Since every outcome is ε-precluded by some prepa-
ration, K0 ∪K1 = K.
If outcome k is ε-precluded by P00, then, because
µ++(λ) ≤ 4 for almost all λ,
∫
Λ
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ)
≤ 4
∫
Λ
µ00(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4ε. (37)
Similarly, if k is ε-precluded by P++,∫
Λ
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4ε. (38)
Therefore, for all k ∈ K0,∫
Λ
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4ε. (39)
Similarly, for all k ∈ K1,∫
Λ
µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4ε. (40)
If, now, we assume the PUC,
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) = µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ), (41)
it follows that, for all k ∈ K,
∫
Λ
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ)
=
∫
Λ
µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ) pk(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4ε. (42)
Summing over all k ∈ K yields
∫
Λ
µ00(λ)µ++(λ) dP¯ (λ)
=
∫
Λ
µ0+(λ)µ+0(λ) dP¯ (λ) ≤ 4mε. (43)
Because of the inequalities (9),
ω(P00, P++) ≤ F (P00, P++) ≤ 2
√
mε
ω(P0+, P+0) ≤ F (P0+, P+0) ≤ 2
√
mε,
(44)
from which it follows that
δ(P00, P++) ≥ H(P00, P++)2 ≥ 1− 2
√
mε,
δ(P0+, P+0) ≥ H(P0+, P+0)2 ≥ 1− 2
√
mε.
(45)
Corollary 1. Let Pxy, x, y ∈ {0,+} be four probability
distributions on a measurable space 〈Λ,S〉 that satisfy the
Preparation Uninformativeness Condition. If, for every
ε > 0, there is an experiment Eε, such that each outcome
of Eε is ε-precluded by some Pxy, then
δ(P00, P++) = δ(P0+, P+0) = 1.
6The condition that P00 be ontologically distinct from
P++ and P0+ be ontologically distinct from P+0 en-
tails that, though the ontic state λ might not uniquely
determine which preparation was performed, it always
uniquely determines at least one of the two preparations.
If an ontic state λ is compatible with |0〉A|0〉B but
does not uniquely determine the A-preparation, then,
since it can’t be compatible with |+〉A|+〉B, it must be
compatible with |+〉A|0〉B and, hence, incompatible with
|0〉A|+〉B. In such a case, λ is compatible with only one
B-preparation, |0〉B. Similar conclusions hold for any
other ontic states; any ontic state will either uniquely de-
termine the A-preparation or the B-preparation. Thus,
if the PUC is satisfied in a situation in which two choices
are made for A-preparation and for B-preparation, for
almost all ontic states λ, λ determines either a fact of
the matter about the quantum state of A or a fact of the
matter about the quantum state of B.
Now consider the case of a large number N of
systems, each of which is subject to a |0〉 or |+〉
preparation. This gives us 2N possible preparations
of the joint system. Suppose that, for each pair
〈α, β〉 of these systems, there is an experiment such
that each outcome of the experiment rules out one
of {|0〉α|0〉β , |0〉α|+〉β , |+〉α|0〉β , |+〉α|+〉β}. That is, for
each 〈x, y〉, x, y ∈ {0,+}, there is an outcome that is
assigned zero probability by all of the 2N−2 probability
distributions corresponding to preparations in which sys-
tem α is subjected to the |x〉 preparation and system β
to the |y〉 preparation. Suppose that the PUC is satis-
fied. By the same reasoning we have applied to the case
of only two systems, it must be the case that, for any
pair α, β of systems, for almost all ontic states λ, the on-
tic state λ uniquely determines the quantum state of at
least one member of the pair. Since this must be true for
every pair, at most one of the systems has its quantum
state undetermined by the ontic state λ.
This means that, for large N , for almost all λ, most
of the systems—at least N − 1 of them—will have their
quantum states uniquely determined by the ontic state
λ. If one of these systems is chosen at random, the prob-
ability of choosing a system in a definite quantum state
is at least 1− 1/N .
We now impose a Principle of Extendibility: any sys-
tem composed of N subsystems of the same type can
be regarded as a part of a larger system consisting of
a greater number of systems of the same type. If we
assume this, then, the state of the individual systems
must be such that, if one is chosen at random, the prob-
ability that its quantum state is uniquely determined by
the ontic state is, for every N , greater than or equal to
1 − 1/N . That is, with probability one, the ontic state
of any whole of which the system may be regarded as a
part is such that the ontic state uniquely determines its
quantum state.
Therefore, if we assume the PUC and the Principle of
Extendibility, and assume also the possibility of exper-
iments that achieve ε-preclusion for arbitrarily small ε,
then, for any system, the preparations |0〉, |+〉 are onto-
logically distinct.
As is shown in ref.[8], for any pair {|ψ〉, |φ〉} such
that |〈φ|ψ〉| ≤ 1/√2, there is a 4-outcome experi-
ment such that each outcome is precluded by one of
{|ψ〉|ψ〉, |ψ〉|φ〉, |φ〉|ψ〉, |φ〉|φ〉}, and hence our proof in-
cludes such cases. The extension in ref. [1] of the re-
sult to arbitrary distinct states makes essential use of the
Cartesian Product Assumption. There does not seem to
be an obvious way to use the PUC to demonstrate on-
tological distinctness of arbitrary distinct pure quantum
states. We leave it as an open question whether this is
possible. The argument of the present paper can, how-
ever, be invoked to show that, for the case of {|ψ〉, |φ〉}
with 1/
√
2 < |〈φ|ψ〉| < 1, for sufficiently large N the N -
fold product |ψ〉1 . . . |ψ〉N is ontologically distinct from
|φ〉1 . . . |φ〉N .
VI. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTION OF
ARBITRARILY STRICT PRECLUSION
In the preceding section we assumed that arbitrarily
close approximations to strict preclusion are possible.
This assumption holds in quantum theories, including
quantum field theories. If, however, we do not assume
that a putative successor theory will reproduce the quan-
tum predictions precisely, but require only a close ap-
proximation to quantum predictions in the domains in
which quantum theories are known to work well, there
may be in such a theory a bound on how close an approx-
imation to strict preclusion can be achieved. One would
expect that, if this bound is sufficiently small, distinct
quantum states must be at least approximately ontolog-
ically distinct. In this section we show that this is the
case.
To do this, we need a means of quantifying approxi-
mate ontological distinctness. To do this, we imagine the
following game. We have a system ΣN composed of N
subsystems, each of which is to be subjected to a |0〉 or
|+〉 preparation, chosen at random, with each prepara-
tion equiprobable. For each preparation, there is a cor-
responding probability distibution over the ontic state
space of ΣN ; it is assumed that these are known to you.
A preparation of this sort having been performed, you
are presented with the ontic state λ of the joint system.
A referee picks one of the subsystems at random, and you
are asked to guess its preparation, based on knowledge of
the ontic state λ of the joint system. What is the proba-
bility that you will guess correctly? If there is a strategy
such that, with probability one, your guess is correct, this
warrants the conclusion that, with probability one, the
ontic state λ of the whole uniquely determines the quan-
tum state of each subsystem. If there is a strategy such
that, with probability close to one, your guess is correct,
this warrants the conclusion that, with high probability,
the ontic state λ of the whole is such that it at least ap-
proximately determines the quantum state of most of the
7subsystems.
In the case of perfect preclusion, on the assump-
tion of the PUC and the Principle of Extendibility,
there is a strategy that succeeds with probability one.
As we have seen in the previous section, if, for each
pair of subsystems 〈α, β〉, there is an experiment such
that each outcome of the experiment rules out one of
{|0〉α|0〉β, |0〉α|+〉β , |+〉α|0〉β , |+〉α|+〉β}, then this, to-
gether with the PUC, entails that, for almost all ontic
states λ, for at leastN−1 of the subsystems the quantum
state is uniquely determined by the ontic state. There is,
therefore, a strategy that is guaranteed to get at least
N − 1 guesses right. The remaining system may have its
quantum state left undetermined by the ontic state. In
the absence of any information about the ontic state, a
random guess has probability one-half of being correct.
Knowledge of the ontic state cannot decrease the proba-
bility on an optimal strategy of guessing the state of any
subsystem correctly. Therefore, on an optimal strategy
for this game, the expectation value of the number of
correct guesses must satisfy,
〈# correct guesses〉 ≥ N − 1
2
. (46)
If one of the subsystems is chosen at random, the prob-
ability that you have correctly guessed its preparation
is
P (correct guess) =
1
N
〈# correct guesses〉
≥ 1− 1
2N
. (47)
We now assume the Principle of Extendibility, which re-
quires that the state of our composite system be compat-
ible with its being regarded as part of an larger system
composed of an arbitrarily high number of subsystems.
On this assumption, inequality (47) must hold for all N .
Therefore, the probability of correcting guessing the state
of a randomly chosen subsystem is
P (correct guess) = 1, (48)
from which it follows that the ontic state of the whole
uniquely determines the quantum state of each of the
subsystems.
We now show that, if it is possible to achieve ε-
preclusion, for small ε, then the probability of guessing
correctly is close to one.
We assume pairwise ε-preclusion. That is, we assume
that there exists ε > 0 such that, for each pair of subsys-
tems 〈α, β〉, there is a 4-outcome experiment Eαβ such
that, for each outcome k of Eαβ , there are x, y ∈ {0,+}
such that k has probability less than or equal to ε on any
preparation in which α is subjected to |x〉 and β to |y〉.
For any subsystem α, for x ∈ {0,+}, let P¯αx be the
probability distribution that is an equally weighted mix-
ture of all distributions on which α has been subjected
to the |x〉 preparation, and let µ¯αx be its density function.
For any pair 〈α, β〉, and any x, y ∈ {0,+}, let P¯αβxy be the
equally weighted mixture of all distributions on which α
has been subjected to the |x〉 preparation and β to the
|y〉 preparation, and let µ¯αβxy be the corresponding density
function. We must have, by Theorem 2.
ω(P¯αβ++, P¯
αβ
00 ) ≤ 2
√
ε; ω(P¯αβ+0 , P¯
αβ
0+ ) ≤ 2
√
ε. (49)
We adopt the following strategy. Given an ontic state λ
of ΣN ,
• For any subsystem α, guess |0〉α if µ¯α0 (λ) ≥ µ¯α+(λ);
|+〉α otherwise.
This has the consequence that, for any pair 〈α, β〉,
• If your guess is |+〉α|+〉β , then µ¯αβ++(λ) > µ¯αβ00 (λ);
• If your guess is |+〉α|0〉β , then µ¯αβ+0(λ) > µ¯αβ0+(λ);
• If your guess is |0〉α|+〉β , then µ¯αβ0+(λ) > µ¯αβ+0(λ);
• If your guess is |0〉α|0〉β , then µ¯αβ00 (λ) ≥ µ¯αβ++(λ).
We ask: on this strategy, for any pair 〈α, β〉, what is the
probability that the strategy yields incorrect guesses for
both members of the pair?
If the preparation is one on which α and β are both
subjected to the |0〉 preparation, then both guesses are in-
correct only if µ¯αβ++(λ) > µ¯
αβ
00 (λ). Let Λ
αβ
++ be the subset
of Λ on which this holds, and let Ωαβ++ be its complement
in Λ. The probability that both guesses are incorrect is
P¯αβ00 (Λ
αβ
++). We have
P¯αβ00 (Λ
αβ
++) =
∫
Λ++
µ¯αβ00 (λ) dP¯ (λ)
≤
∫
Λ++
µ¯αβ00 (λ) dP¯ (λ) +
∫
Ω
αβ
++
µ¯αβ++(λ) dP¯ (λ)
=
∫
Λ
min
(
µ¯αβ00 (λ), µ¯
αβ
++(λ)
)
dP¯ (λ)
= ω(P¯αβ00 , P¯
αβ
++). (50)
Thus, when the preparation is |0〉α|0〉β , the probability
that both guesses are incorrect is less than or equal to
ω(P¯αβ00 , P¯
αβ
++). By Theorem 2, this is less than or equal to
2
√
ε. The same holds for the other preparations. There-
fore, the probability of two incorrect guesses satisfies,
P (both guesses incorrect) ≤ 2√ε. (51)
If, out of all the guesses for allN subsystems, our strategy
yields more than one incorrect guess, then for some pair
〈α, β〉, both members of are guessed incorrectly. There
areN(N−1)/2 pairs in all, for each of which the probabil-
ity of getting both incorrect is at most 2
√
ε. ; therefore,
the probability of more than one incorrect guess satisfies,
P (more than one incorrect) ≤ N(N − 1)√ε. (52)
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isfies
〈# correct guesses〉 ≥ (N − 1)(1−N(N − 1)√ε), (53)
and the probability that a randomly chosen subsystem is
guessed correctly satisfies
P (correct guess) ≥ (1 − 1/N)(1−N(N − 1)√ε)
= 1− 1/N − (N − 1)2√ε. (54)
If, now, we assume the Principle of Extendibility, this
must be true for all N . We can use this to obtain a lower
bound on the probability of a correct guess. We have, for
all N ,
P (correct guess) ≥ 1− 1/N − (N − 1)2√ε
≥ 1− 1/N −N2√ε. (55)
LetNε be the largest integerN such 2N
3
√
ε ≤ 1. That
is,
2N3ε
√
ε ≤ 1 ≤ 2(Nε + 1)3
√
ε. (56)
Then, because of the left-hand inequality in (56),
N2ε
√
ε ≤ 2−2/3ε1/6, (57)
and, because of the right-hand inequality in (56),
Nε ≥ 2−1/3ε−1/6 − 1, (58)
and so
1/Nε +N
2
ε
√
ε ≤
(
21/3
1− 21/3ε1/6 + 2
−2/3
)
ε1/6. (59)
This gives us our bound.
P (correct guess) ≥ 1−
(
21/3
1− 21/3ε1/6 + 2
−2/3
)
ε1/6.
(60)
To leading order in ε, the right hand side of this is
1−
(
21/3 + 2−2/3
)
ε1/6 ≈ 1− 1.9 ε1/6. (61)
VII. APPENDIX
In this section we illustrate the assertion that, even
if the CPA is assumed, the PUC is strictly weaker than
the NCA, by constructing a simple model of the setup of
PBR’s example that reproduces the quantum probabili-
ties for the outcomes of the experiment considered, and
satisfies the CPA and PUC, but not the NCA.
We adapt Spekkens’ toy theory for the purpose [9].
In Spekkens’ theory, an elementary system consists of
four boxes and a ball that can be in any one of the four
boxes. On this theory, nonorthogonal preparations are
ontologically indistinct, and product-state preparations
on a pair of systems yield independent probabilities for
the states of the systems. The four preparations in our
example, therefore, have nonzero common overlap when
modelled in this theory, which is incompatible with the
quantum preclusions for the experiment considered.
To construct a model that reproduces the correct
quantum probabilities for the experiment considered, we
must, therefore, change the theory’s rules for assigning
probability distributions to preparations. The proba-
bility distributions corresponding to these preparations
must be ones on which the states of the two subsystems
are not probabilistically independent. It is possible to do
so while satisfying the PUC.
Here is one way to do it. Let the |0〉 preparation be one
in which the boxes 1, 2, 3 have probabilities 1/2, 1/4, 1/4,
respectively, and the |+〉 preparation be one on which
boxes 2, 3, 4 have probabilities 1/4, 1/4, 1/2. Let the joint
preparation distributions be as depicted in Fig 1. In these
diagrams, the horizontal axis represents the position of
ball A, and the vertical axis, the position of ball B. The
support of the probability distribution is indicated by
the shaded squares, and each shaded square is taken to
have equal probability. On this choice of distributions,
P00 and P++ are ontologically distinct, as they must be
in order to recover the preclusions while satisfying the
PUC, though each has non-null overlap with the other
two distributions. The same is true of P0+ and P+0, and
so the PUC is satisfied.
To complete our model, it remains to fill in the re-
sponse probabilities for the experiment. We must spec-
ify four probability functions {p1, p2, p3, p4} on the state
space of the joint system, in such a way that the prepa-
ration distributions we have already specified yield the
correct probabilities for the outcome of the experiment,
including, crucially, the preclusions. The simplest way
to do this is to adopt deterministic response functions;
we partition the state space into four disjoint regions, in
each of which one of the four outcomes of the experiment
is yielded with certainty. The constraint of yielding the
correct quantum probabilities leaves considerable arbi-
trariness in how this is done; in Figure 2 is exhibited one
way of doing it. The outcome of the experiment is |ξ1〉 if
both balls are in box 3 or 4, |ξ2〉 if ball A is in box 3 or 4
and ball B is in box 1 or 2, |ξ3〉 if ball A is in box 1 or 2
and ball B is in box 3 or 4, and |ξ4〉 if both balls are in
box 1 or 2.
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FIG. 1: The probability distributions for the example.
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FIG. 2: Response regions for the four outcomes.
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